COENA NAMES THREE PRESIDENTIAL FINALISTS

id: 143340

date: 2/27/2008 19:43

refid: 08SANSALVADOR238

origin: Embassy San Salvador

classification: CONFIDENTIAL

destination:

header:

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PP RUEHWEB

 

DE RUEHSN #0238/01 0581943

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

P 271943Z FEB 08

FM AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9092

INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

 

 

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SAN SALVADOR 000238

 

SIPDIS

 

SIPDIS

 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2018

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KDEM, ES

SUBJECT: ARENA: COENA NAMES THREE PRESIDENTIAL FINALISTS

 

REF: SAN SALVADOR 147 AND PREVIOUS

 

Classified By: The Ambassador, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

 

1. (C) Summary: Rodrigo Avila, Luis Mario Rodriguez and Ana

Vilma de Escobar were named February 26 as the three

finalists in the race to become ARENA's presidential

candidate.  There is unhappiness and worry in COENA, ARENA's

executive board, over President Saca's heavy handed

management of the process.  End Summary.

 

2. (C) COENA, the Executive Board of the ruling ARENA party,

reportedly met February 24 to agree on the final list of

three competitors to be the party's candidate for President

of El Salvador.  The decision eliminates former Foreign

Minister Francisco "Pancho" Lainez and ARENA founding member

Eduardo Barrientos from consideration.  Lainez' exclusion

from the list of candidates moving forward was floated in the

press February 25.  COENA announced the unanimous decision

formally February 26.

 

3. (C) Not surprisingly, given their ties to President Saca,

former PNC director Rodrigo Avila and former Presidential

Legal Advisor Luis Mario Rodriguez made the cut.  VP de

Escobar also made it onto the list of finalists, though few

observers believe she will become ARENA's candidate.  ARENA

founding member Eduardo Barrientos' elimination came as no

surprise (even to him, apparently) given his low level of

name recognition and lack of a defined base of support inside

the party.  ARENA still plans to select its candidate on

March 15.

 

4. (C) Poloff discussed ARENA's candidate selection process

with Roberto Murray Meza, COENA member, February 26.  Murray

repeatedly said a significant number of COENA members are

quite upset at President Saca's handling of the process, a

sentiment shared by a number of businessmen and a large

segment of the middle class.  Hours before the decision was

announced, Murray said the decision to include Rodriguez as a

third candidate was still up in the air, saying it was

possible COENA would announce only two finalists.

 

5. (C) Murray said he believed Saca was convinced he had

sufficient power within ARENA and access to sufficient

financial resources in order to force the selection of his

preferred candidate -- Rodrigo Avila -- and fund the

resulting campaign, even if ARENA's traditional donors

balked.  Murray described himself and others in COENA as

disappointed with the process and the result.  Saca, he said,

hadn't even gone through the motions of genuinely consulting

with the party.  Salvadoran presidents, he continued, have

maneuvered to support their preferred candidates in the past,

but have never been this blatant.  Murray said he was quite

concerned that Salvadoran business interests that have

traditionally supported ARENA will be sufficiently angered at

being expected to fund a candidate without consultation or

support that they may be strongly tempted to refuse.

 

6. (C) Murray said Saca has told COENA members the U.S.

Embassy and Washington support Rodrigo Avila as ARENA's

candidate.  PolCouns noted that while the USG has had a long,

productive working relationship with Avila, we do not

"support" his or any other candidacy.  Murray said while most

on COENA recognized that, some were probably more comfortable

supporting Avila based on Saca's assertions, even though they

strongly suspected they were false.  Murray, reflecting on an

Avila run for President, said "well, we have time to teach

him to talk, but not to think."  Murray said he hoped the

time remaining until the presidential vote in March 2009

would give ARENA time to heal its wounds, win the election,

and then set out to ensure this never happens again.  Murray

said there were already some quiet discussions of amending

ARENA's statutes to prevent a sitting Salvadoran president

from serving as President of COENA.  In the end, he

acknowledged, COENA members had no one to blame but

themselves for allowing this to take place.

 

7. (C) Murray said he understood businessman Ricardo Poma, a

patron of VP de Escobar, had approached Saca to argue against

excluding her from the list of ARENA finalists.  Murray said

that approach appears to have paid off.

 

8. (C) Finally Murray was struck by the irony that when he

was considering standing as a candidate, he had spoken with

Arturo Zablah (then and once again a putative presidential

candidate for an FDR-PDC-CD alliance) who had suggested he

would throw his support to ARENA to prevent an FMLN victory.

Murray had reported this to Saca, who dismissed the offer.

Now, Murray said, it seems Saca has managed to replace a

likely scenario of everyone against the FMLN with just the

opposite.  A Zablah run now would likely attract disenchanted

ARENA supporters.

 

9. (C) Commment: Inside and outside ARENA, most observers

believe the fix is in and Rodrigo Avila will be selected as

the party's candidate on March 15.  But ARENA insiders (aside

from Saca and his inner circle, it seems) are concerned about

Avila's candidacy and eventual government.  Avila is a well

known quantity to the USG; our experience suggests he would

need a strong chief of staff to make his administration

successful, given the relative weakness of his organizational

and administrative skills versus his leadership qualities.

 

10. (C) Comment continued: Once ARENA's improvised, cloudy,

and in many ways flawed candidate selection process, the

party will have its work cut out for it, not just in the

upcoming campaign, but in repairing the damage that has been

done inside the party.  Saca's apparent manipulation of the

candidate selection process has resulted in broad resentment

inside the party, and could well diminish financial and other

support during the campaign.  Under these circumstances, a

Zablah run could easily force a second round for the

presidential vote in April 2009 and ARENA might be

unintentionally incubating a future center-left force in

Salvadoran politics.

GLAZER

 

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