THE AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH DEFENSE CHIEF VASQUEZ

id: 217183

date: 7/17/2009 21:58

refid: 09TEGUCIGALPA615

origin: Embassy Tegucigalpa

classification: SECRET//NOFORN

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TEGUCIGALPA 000615

 

NOFORN

SIPDIS

 

STATE FOR WHA/CEN

 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2019

TAGS: AEMR, ASEC, CASC, KFLO, MARR, PREL, PINR, AMGT, PGOV,

TFHO1, HO

SUBJECT: TFHO1: THE AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH DEFENSE CHIEF

VASQUEZ

 

REF: A/S SHANNON-AMBASSADOR LLORENS TELCON 07/16/09

 

Classified By: Ambassador Hugo Llorens, reason 1.4 (b & d)

 

1. (S/NF) Summary: The Ambassador and DATT met with Honduran

Chief of Defense (CHOD) MG Romeo Vasquez Velasquez to press

the importance of the de facto regime's serious participation

in the Arias-led negotiations on July 18, as well as the

repercussions if the talks do not show substantive progress.

The Ambassador reiterated the firm USG position that the

democratic and constitutional order be restored rapidly.

Vasquez agreed to deliver this message to de facto regime

President Micheletti. Vasquez expressed his own willingness

to support a negotiated resolution and restoration of

President Zelaya, but noted the armed forces were concerned

that civilian politicians would make them the scapegoat for

the coup and crisis. End summary.

 

2. (S/NF) The Ambassador and DATT met with Vasquez at a

neutral location in accordance with Department guidance

(Ref). The Ambassador informed Vasquez he was under

instructions to make a major effort to reach out to key

Honduran political, business and civil society figures to

convince them of the critical importance that the de facto

Micheletti regime engage in serious negotiations in the next

mediation round sponsored by President Arias on June 18 in

San Jose. He reiterated the U.S. and international community

insistence that the democratic and constitutional order be

re-established and that the legitimate President of Honduras,

Manuel Zelaya, be restored to office. The Ambassador

stressed the Arias mediation effort offered the most viable

diplomatic channel to restore the democratic order but also

took into consideration the concerns of Zelaya's opponents

and the de facto regime's supporters.

 

3. (S/NF) The Ambassador expressed concern that failure to

make substantive progress on July 18 could result in the

collapse of the Arias effort, which would bring about

significant negative consequences for Honduras and only

assure the international community would take a harder line.

The Ambassador also stressed that failure to resolve the

crisis soon would force the USG to adopt punitive measures

against both the de facto regime and the individuals

responsible for the coup and the continuation of the crisis.

(Note: Unstated but understood was the likelihood of the

revocation of visas for individuals the USG deemed culpable

for the crisis. End note.)

 

4. (S/NF) The Ambassador underscored the longstanding support

and friendship the USG and the people of the United States

held for Honduras. He said the United States had always

valued Honduras as a democratic ally, and that the United

States remained firm in its commitment to democracy in

Honduras. He noted the restoration of the democratic order

would allow for normalization of bilateral relations and

mil-mil cooperation. He urged Vasquez to approach the de

facto regime leadership and Micheletti himself to press them

on the importance of engaging in serious negotiations under

the Arias effort.

 

5. (S/NF) Vasquez initially discussed the armed forces'

(HOAF) effort to avoid being dragged into the political

crisis caused by President Zelaya's struggle with his

opponents over his desired referendum, i.e. the "Fourth Urn."

But in the end, he said, the HOAF had been manipulated by

all sides. Vasquez attempted to justify the coup action,

asserting that the military was simply following the orders

of the Supreme Court on June 28. He said he had always been

loyal to President Zelaya but the Supreme Court's order was

constitutional. Vasquez then lamented that Micheletti and

his advisors were the same people who were unable to show

flexibility before the events of June 28, stubborn and

aggressive. Vasquez said Micheletti and his core team

continue to take a hard line. Nevertheless, after extensive

discussion Vasquez agreed that in the interest of the

Honduran people and U.S. relations he would go to Micheletti

 

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and convey the Ambassador's message. Vasquez added the

timing of the Ambassador's visit was opportune, because he

would be going directly to a meeting at the Presidential

Palace to discuss the negotiating strategy for July 18.

 

6. (S/NF) Speaking in general about the current situation,

Vasquez noted the most difficult obstacle for the success of

the mediation was the almost pathological fear of Zelaya and

his association with Venezuelan President Chavez, held not

only by the leadership of the de facto regime, but of the

overwhelming majority of their supporters. While Vasquez

understood the diplomatic balance sheet argued for supporting

the Arias process, an early return of Zelaya could weaken

Honduran democratic institutions. He added that while the

threatening rhetoric of Chavez and Zelaya was intense, his

own view was that Zelaya's support was on the decline in the

country. Vasquez said HOAF intelligence revealed that a

significant amount of Venezuelan funding was pouring into

social sectors to build support for the pro-Zelaya movement,

but that nationwide no more than 7,500 people were

participating in the week's pro-Zelaya demonstrations,

indicating waning support.

 

7. (S/NF) Comment: Vasquez seems torn but we believe he is

looking for the U.S. to help him find a way out and will

carry our message to the Micheletti camp. What is also clear

is that the HOAF is increasingly concerned they will be left

holding the bag or made into the villain in this crisis.

Whatever deal is made, the military leadership must be kept

in the loop in order for it to succeed. End comment.

LLORENS

 

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